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The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Bush v. Gore, sparked a
considerable amount of criticism and discussion. During this debate, many
scholars have argued that the Court's decision was fundamentally incompatible
with its previous federalism decisions. This article contends that this criticism is
misplaced. It argues that while the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore decision
embraced a novel and rather expansive understanding of equal protection that
seems largely out of character for the Rehnquist Court, the Court's decision to
intervene and resolve the election dispute was not inconsistent with its general
approach to constitutional federalism.
This article argues that the contention that the Bush v. Gore decision is
inconsistent with the core aspects of the Rehnquist Court's federalism
jurisprudence is overdrawn in two important respects. First, it argues that to
describe the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions solely in terms of their
solicitude for states political autonomy or "respecting states' rights" is too
simplistic. Secondly, it argues that the Bush v. Gore decision is fully consistent
with previous federal jurisprudence decisions that the Court should resolve any
questions of constitutional meaning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bush v. Gore,' the United States Supreme Court ended the legal dispute
over the 2000 presidential election and effectively awarded the presidency to
George W. Bush. In a per curiam opinion joined by five Justices, the Court
reversed the December 8, 2000 judgment of the Florida Supreme Court that had
ordered the manual counting of all "undervoted" ballots in the state.2 The Court
held that the procedures governing the manual count did "not satisfy the
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters" under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, leading to "unequal evaluation
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the assistance of Sri Srinivasan and Walter Dellinger with this article. Thanks also to George
Alexander, Stuart Banner, Andrew Berke, June Carbone, Howard Fink, David Franklin, Leslie
Griffin, Jeff Kahn, Pam Karlan, Jay Koh, Ira Lit, Ken Manaster, Richard Primus, Srija
Srinivasan, Ed Steinman, Shirley Woodward, and the participants in a faculty workshop at
Washington University in St. Louis for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
'531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2 Id. at 11l. The "undervoted" ballots were those for which vote-counting machines
registered no vote for president, and "overvoted" ballots were those registering multiple votes
for president. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITuTION, AND THE COURTS .9-10 (2001).
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of ballots in various respects.",3 Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court had not
specified a uniform standard for discerning the "intent of the voter"; some
counties had manually counted both the overvoted and the undervoted ballots,
while others were evaluating only the undervotes; and the certified vote total in at
least one county included the results of a partially completed manual count.4 The
Court further held that, according Florida law, no election contest proceeding
could continue past December 12, six days before the meeting of the Electoral
College.' As the Court rendered its decision at 10 p.m. on December 12, Vice
President Gore's contest, of the certified vote totals could go no further, and
Florida's twenty-five electoral votes were awarded to Bush.6
Although some commentators have defended the Court's analysis,7 and a few
others have defended the outcome,8 most have denounced the decision as
unprincipled and even lawless. 9 Criticisms have varied, but many are tinged with
3Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06.
'Id. at 105-09.
5Id. at 10.
6 See Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.7See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 657 (2001) (approving of the Court's holding that the recount proceeding violated the
Equal Protection Clause but finding that the remedy of ending the election contest was difficult
to defend); Note, Non Sub Homine? A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election
2000, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2170 (2001); Charles Fried, "A Badly Flawed Election": An
Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8.
8See POSNER, supra note 2, at 9-10 (defending the Court's two election decisions, not
based on their legal analysis, but as "a pragmatically defensible series of responses to a looming
political and constitutional crisis"); Richard Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature
Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 614
(2001) (finding the Article II grounds for Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion
persuasive, but dismissing the per curiam opinion's equal protection analysis '.'as a confused
nonstarter at best, which deserves much of the scorn that has been heaped upon it").
9See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The'Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine
on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001), available at http://www.thevotebook.com; Michael
J. Klarman, Bush v Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001) (on file with author); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68
U. CHI. L. REv. 679 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U.
CHI. L. REv. 737 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001);
Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3;
Renata Adler, Irreparable Harm, NEW REPUBLIC, July 30,2001, at 29; Akhil Amar, Should We
Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at M1; Ronald Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election,
N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53; Henry T. Greely, Court's Intervention Breaks the
Faith, S.J. MERC. NEWS, Dec. 15, 2000, at B7; Neal Kumar Katyal, Politics Over Principle,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35; Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000,
at 18; Unsafe Harbor, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 9.
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the accusation that the Court acted hypocritically.' ° The per curiam opinion
embraced a novel application of the Equal Protection Clause to interfere with the
traditional state function of running elections," and the remedy that the Court
ordered-ending the election contest-was based on its own interpretation of
Florida election law, apparently encroaching on the Florida Supreme Court's
authority to determine the meaning of Florida statutes. 12 Yet the five justices who
joined that opinion have, on prior occasions, emphasized the importance of
respecting "the autonomy, the decisionmaking ability, and the sovereign capacity
of the States,"' 13 and on that basis have declared several acts of Congress
unconstitutional. The election decision's intrusion into "functions essential to [the
separate] and independent existence" of the states, 14 many have suggested, is
irreconcilable with the fact that "the Rehnquist Court has been built on the rock of
respecting states' rights, not interfering with them."''5
Whatever the merits of these criticisms on other grounds, the contention that
Bush v. Gore is inconsistent with the core aspects of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism jurisprudence is overdrawn in two important respects. 16 First, to
0 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERsHowrrz, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIGHJACKED ELECTION 2000 121-72 .(2001); Frank Goodman, The Supreme Court's
Federalism: Real or Imagined-Preface, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 9, 14
(2001); Klarman, supra note 9, at 5; Katyal, supra note 9, at A35. I particularly enjoyed Dahlia
Lithwick's description:
In public, [the Rehnquist Court] struts and frets about the 'balance of powers' and
federalism and its role in the big picture. But look at what happened in Florida. It was the
All You Can Eat Breakfast Buffet at the Bellagio down there. States' rights went the way
of the shrimp platter, and federalism was the bowl of guacamole.
Dahlia Lithwick, The High Court's Eating Disorder, SLATE, July 3, 2001, available at
http://Slate.msn.com/courtJentries/01-07-03_111437.asp.
" See Strauss, supra note 9, at 739-40; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 764-65.
12 See Goodman, supra note 10, at 14; Strauss, supra note 9, at 742; Sunstein, supra note 9,
at 767-68.
13 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
isKatyal, supra note 9, at A35; see also Balkin, supra note 9, at 1426 ("It is ironic that the
extension" of federal constitutional principles into state election procedures "is being carried out
by the Justices most committed to protecting state sovereign prerogatives against federal
intrusion."); Goodman, supra note 10, at 14-15 ("One would have expected the five
conservative justices to be the first, not the last, to adhere to the well-established principle that a '
state supreme court is the final authority on the meaning of state law."); Klarman, supra note 9,
at 5 ("[t]hese Justices' oft-professed commitment to federalism and to judicial restraint logically
should have led them to the opposite result."); cf POSNER, supra note 2, at 218 ("The decision
deals a blow to states' rights by overriding a state supreme court's interpretation of its own
state's statute.").
16By "Rehnquist Court," I mean no particular set of Justices but instead the Court as an
institution during William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice. Thus, several of the
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describe the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions solely in terms of their
solicitude for states' political autonomy or "respecting states' rights" is too
simplistic. Constitutional federalism has two sides: (1) the limits on Congress'
powers, which protect the states from an overweening federal government, and
(2) the limits on state power, which preserve federal supremacy where Congress
is competent to regulate and protect the interests of the nation from parochial state
interference. 7 To be sure, one of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court has been
its reinvigoration of the federalism-based limits on congressional power. This
Court has interpreted several constitutional provisions in a manner that has
imposed new restrictions on Congress' legislative authority, and these decisions
have enhanced, at least modestly, states' political autonomy.
But the Rehnquist Court has not introduced similar changes to the other,
"union-preserving" side of federalism: the structural limits on state authority.'
8
Rather, the Court has enforced the Constitution's limitations on state power--
principally those contained in the doctrine of preemption and the dormant
Commerce Clause-quite vigorously, frequently striking down state exercises of
the traditional police power because of their interference with competing national
interests. Indeed, in federalism disputes not involving the breadth of Congress'
powers, this Court has regularly favored federal policy priorities and the interests
of the national economy over assertions of state sovereignty, even while
acknowledging the implications of these decisions for the federal-state balance.' 9
Thus, while the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution" has imposed new
limits on Congress, and thereby modestly enhanced some aspects of state
autonomy, it has not championed states' political independence more generally.
Second, Bush v. Gore is fully consistent with-indeed, it exemplifies--
another important facet of the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence: the
20Court's assertion of primacy in resolving questions of constitutional meaning.
Although the explicit doctrinal effect of the Court's "new federalism" decisions
characteristics I attribute to the Rehnquist Court are the product of different majorities of
Justices.
'
7 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-1, at 1021 (3d ed.
2000); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1502 (1994);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125,
135 n.22; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
109 HARv. L. REV. 78, 103 (1995).
" The term "union-preserving" comes from TRIBE, supra note 17, at § 6-1, at 1021.
19See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997) (holding that aspect of Louisiana
community property law was preempted by ERISA despite acknowledging the "central role
community property laws play in the nine community property states," and that community
property laws "implement policies and values lying within the traditional domain of the
States").20See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court v. Balance of Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
March 3, 2001, at A13; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000, at
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has been to limit congressional authority vis-A-vis the states, an implicit (and
perhaps more significant) consequence has concerned the separation of national
powers between the judicial and legislative branches.2' Specifically, these
decisions have enhanced the power of the Court relative to Congress, making the
judiciary the exclusive arbiter of constitutional questions that, at least for the past
several generations, have been entrusted largely to the political process. For
instance, the Court has ruled that only the judiciary can provide the final answers
to whether Congress has exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause,
whether Congress has transgressed the restrictions imposed by the Tenth
Amendment, and whether Congress has gone beyond its authority to enact
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to
each of these issues, the Court has replaced substantial deference to the judgments
of Congress with independent and fairly rigorous standards of judicial review. In
some instances, the Court has expressly justified this aggressive review on the
ground that Congress' institutional incentives render its determinations unworthy
of deference-in other words, that Congress cannot be trusted to make principled
judgments about the proper division of authority between the national
government and the states.22
Bush v. Gore fits this pattern nicely. It is another instance of the Rehnquist
Court asserting the judiciary's role (or, in its words, "unsought responsibility, 23)
to resolve the relevant constitutional questions rather than deferring to the
political process.24 For had the Court not ended the election dispute, it appeared
likely that Congress would have been forced to decide whether the manual count
of the undervoted ballots ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause and the "Manner directed" Clause of Article
1.25 Had Vice President Gore prevailed after the hand count, the Florida
legislature almost certainly would have appointed a separate slate of Bush
2, See Larry Kramer, The Arrogance of the Court, WASH. POST, May 23, 2000, at A29.
" See infra text accompanying notes 211-14.23 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
24See Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at
A33; Charles Lane, Laying Down the Law, Justices Ruled With Confidence: From Bush v.
Gore Onward, Activism Marked Past Term, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at A6 (quoting Walter
Dellinger as stating that the Court "assumes that it is more qualified than Congress to resolve
disputed electoral votes, more entitled than the president's agencies to fill gaps in federal law
and better equipped than the professional golf association to determine the rules of golf").25See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 768-69. Article II, § 1, clause 2 of the Constitution states:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State maybe
entitled in the Congress." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision ordering a hand count of the undervoted ballots had so misconstrued Florida election
law as to disregard the instructions of the Florida legislature, thus violating the "Manner
directed" Clause. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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electors, and both sets of electoral votes would have been forwarded to Congress.
Congress then would have been required to decide, according to the procedures
set forth in the Electoral Count Act,26 which set of electors had been lawfully
appointed. By granting certiorari and deciding the case as it did, the Court
determined that it was the proper institution to resolve these momentous questions
of constitutional meaning to the exclusion of democratic politics.
27
The point of this article is not to offer a normative assessment of the
Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence-to evaluate whether its differing
approaches to the two sides of federalism can be reconciled, or to assess the
wisdom of this shift in authority from Congress to the Court in the enforcement of
the boundaries of federal power. Rather, my aim is simply to debunk the popular
conception that Bush v. Gore is somehow fundamentally incompatible with this
Court's prior federalism decisions.2 8 Once one considers how this Court has
decided federalism issues not involving the breadth of Congress' powers, and
how it has viewed its role relative to Congress' in resolving constitutional
questions implicating the federal-state balance, the election decision is largely
consistent with what has come before. In fact, Bush v. Gore may be the
quintessential example of the Rehnquist Court's unwillingness to defer to
Congress-that is, its profound distrust of politics as an arbiter of constitutional
meaning.
II. THE "UNION-PRESERVING" SIDE OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
Perhaps the single constitutional objective with which the Rehnquist Court
has become most closely associated is the "[p]reservation of the States as
independent and autonomous political entities. 29 The number of federal statutes
26Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 15 (1994)).
27 See Karlan, supra note 9, at 92 ("Once again.... the Court intervened to short-circuit the
normal, albeit potentially contentious and messy, process of self-government.").28 Relatedly, Professor Richard Pildes has contended that Bush v. Gore is consistent with
the Rehnquist Court's "cultural" attitude toward democracy--"the empirical assumptions,
historical interpretations, and normative ideals of democracy that seem to inform and influence
the current constitutional law of democracy." Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001). Specifically, Pildes suggests that, consistent with several of
the Rehnquist Court's other decisions concerning the regulation of elections, Bush v. Gore
might be explained by a "cultural view, not a narrowly partisan preference, that 'democracy'
required judicially-ensured order, stability, and certainty, rather than judicial acceptance of the
'crisis' that partisan political resolution might be feared by some to have entailed." Id. at 715.29 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997); see, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SC. 24, 25 (2001) ("Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence has been the revival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional
federalism."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review,
Sovereign Immunity, and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2000)
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that this Court has partially or completely invalidated in the name of protecting
the 'residuary and inviolable sovereignty' reserved explicitly to the States" 30 is,
in many respects, startling. The Court has invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones
Act and the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as
beyond Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, finding them
impermissible intrusions on the states' traditional police power.3' It has held that
the Clean Water Act and the federal arson statute do not reach substantial
categories of conduct because the statutes might otherwise exceed Congress'
commerce power.32 It has invalidated provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 and the Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act as inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.33 The Rehnquist Court has
concluded in several important statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), that
Congress did not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity from unconsented
private suits for money damages.3 4 And it has held that the ADA, the ADEA, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress' authority to enact
enforcement legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
These "new federalism" decisions have enhanced the political independence
of state governments, at least as a doctrinal matter. By limiting Congress' power
to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause and sharply restricting its
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has broadened
the domain in which states have exclusive authority to regulate private conduct.
By holding that Congress cannot "commandeer" state legislatures or executive
officials into enacting or enforcing federal regulatory programs, 6 the Court has
restricted the means by which the national government can control the conduct of
("When constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, they undoubtedly will say
that its most significant changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism."); John C.
Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 783 (2001) ("Federalism
has become the defining issue of the Rehnquist Court.").
30 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39,
at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (citation omitted).31 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act).32Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001)
(Clean Water Act); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (arson statute).33 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments of 1985); Printz, 521 U.S. at 898 (Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act).34Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (ADA); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA).35 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 955 (ADA); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (Violence Against Women
Act); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62 (ADEA); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (1997)
(Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
6New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
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state and local governments. And by holding that Congress can abrogate the
sovereign immunity of states from unconsented private suits for money damages
only through legislation validly enacted under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has substantially curtailed a principal means for Congress
to enforce federal law against the states. All else being equal, each of these results
should mean greater autonomy for states in pursuing their own policy agendas. 7
Given this apparent "revolution" in federalism, expressly grounded in a
renewed emphasis on the status of states as sovereigns co-equal with the federal
government, the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore might seem anomalous or,
worse, hypocritical.3" Relying on precedent addressing poll taxes and the
systematic malapportionment of voting districts39-equality concerns
qualitatively different from those presented in the election litigation 4° -the Court
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as imposing a number of procedural
requirements on state election proceedings. 41 States must formulate standards for
evaluating ballots that are more specific than the "intent of the voter": the manual
counting of ballots cannot include undervoted ballots without also including
overvoted ballots, and no jurisdiction within a state can include a partially
completed hand count of the ballots meeting the criteria for reexamination.42
These are significant new constraints on the discretion that states have
traditionally enjoyed in running elections, presumably a core aspect of their
43sovereignty.4
More to the point, the remedy ordered by the Court was that the election
contest must end-that "any recount seeking to meet the December 12 [deadline
established by Florida law] will be unconstitutional."" But the Florida Supreme
37 Whether these decisions ultimately will enhance the political independence of the states,
or whether they instead will prompt the Federal Government to regulate more itself instead of
through state governments, remains to be seen. See id. at 210 (White, J., dissenting) ("The
ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its formalistically rigid obeisance to 'federalism,'
the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer the wishes of state officials in achieving
local solutions to local problems.").38 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her dissenting opinion, "[w]ere the other Members of this
Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142-43 (2000) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
39 Specifically, the Court cited Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).40 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 764 (characterizing Harper and Reynolds as "entirely far
afield").41Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-09.
42 1d.
43See POSNER, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that the Court's equal protection analysis
"portends an ambitious program of federal judicial intervention in the electoral process").
44Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
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Court had not decided that December 12 was a firm deadline under Florida law.45
To reach this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court itself interpreted
Florida law as "requir[ing] that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead
to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. 6 But
whether Florida election law dictated that December 12 was a drop-dead date for
the resolution of any election contest, no matter what had happened during the
original election, was purely a question of state law, and one that the Florida
Supreme Court had not yet addressed.47 By deciding the issue itself, the United
States Supreme Court seemed to disregard a fundamental aspect of Florida's
status as a co-equal sovereign: Florida courts are the ultimate authority on the
meaning of Florida law.4' For these reasons, Bush v. Gore seems to contradict the
Rehnquist Court's commitment to respecting the sovereignty and "dignity"
interests of state governments.
There is a fair measure of truth in this assessment. In addition to enhancing
states' political autonomy, many of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions
have spoken in broad terms about the constitutional significance of the "separate"
and "essential" sovereignty of the states.49 But there is more to the structural
edifice of federalism than the limits on Congress' legislative authority-the
matter that these cases have generally addressed. The Constitution also places
limits on state power, limits that are intended to preserve federal supremacy in
those areas in which Congress is competent to act and to protect the national
interest from parochial state interference. The two principal bases for this "union-
preserving" aspect of federalism are the Supremacy Clause and the dormant
Commerce Clause. ° The Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of preemption,
45 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 767-68.46 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.47 See Goodman, supra note 10, at 14; Klarman, supra note 9, at 14; Sunstein, supra note
9, at 767-68; cf Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (stating that "[n]either this
Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State," and that "[t]his proposition" is
"fundamental to our system of federalism").4
1See Goodman, supra note 10, at 14 ("[Tlhe attribution of that drop-dead date to the
legislature seems a clear usurpation of the interpretive authority of the Florida Supreme
Court."); Strauss, supra note 9, at 742. Strauss states:
In the face of any uncertainty about the Florida legislature's intentions, for the United
States Supreme Court to attribute such an unlikely intention to the Florida legislature
without even remanding, to see what the Florida Supreme Court would say, is
inexplicable-unless, of course, the United States Supreme Court simply did not trust the
Florida Supreme Court to play it straight.
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 768 ("It is not easy to explain the United States Supreme Court's
failure to allow the Florida Supreme Court to consider this issue of Florida law.").49 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49 (1999).
50See Lessig, supra note 17, at 155.
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dictates that validly enacted federal laws shall negate state laws with which they
conflict. The dormant Commerce Clause generally nullifies state laws that place
an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Once we acknowledge that these union-preserving limits on state authority
are an important aspect of "constitutional federalism," the popular conception of
the Rehnquist Court as a steadfast champion of state sovereignty becomes
untenable. Despite the sweeping language of some its more prominent federalism
opinions, this Court's actual devotion to states' political autonomy has varied
widely by context. Although the Rehnquist Court has stressed the importance of
the states' status as co-equal sovereigns in cases addressing the breadth of
Congress' legislative powers, its approach to preemption and dormant Commerce
Clause questions has been quite different. If anything, this Court has tended to
protect the prerogatives of the federal government and the interests of the national
economy at the expense of states' independent policy choices. In this sense,
although the expansive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause embraced in
Bush v. Gore seems uncharacteristic of the Rehnquist Court, the election decision
simply does not contradict this Court's well-established federalism jurisprudence.
In truth, this Court has regularly disregarded important state sovereignty interests
in federalism cases not involving the limits on congressional authority.
A. Preemption
The most pervasive federalism-based limit on state power is preemption, 51 a
doctrine derived from the Supremacy Clause.52 Dating to McCulloch v.
Maryland,53 the Supreme Court has understood the Supremacy Clause to negate
any state law conflicting with federal law.54 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in
Gibbons v. Ogden,55 the Supremacy Clause nullifies state laws that "interfere
with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress. 56 So long as Congress acts within
its enumerated powers, it has the authority to displace state law addressing the
same subject, and it can do so in express or implied terms. State law is expressly
preempted when Congress explicitly states its intent to displace the type of state
5 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 768
(1994) (calling preemption "almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitutional
law in practice").52 The Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).54See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).56Id. at 209.
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regulation at issue.57 State law is impliedly preempted under any of three
conditions: (1) federal law is so comprehensive in a particular field that it
"make[s] reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it";58 (2) it is physically impossible to comply with both federal and
state law;59 or (3) state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."6° Despite these
distinct doctrinal categories, the essential question in every preemption case is the
same: Has Congress intended to displace the type of state law at issue?
6
'
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Congress' authority to preempt
state law is "an extraordinary power"62 that has enormous implications for the
constitutional balance between the federal government and the states.63 The fields
regulated in some fashion by Congress have grown dramatically since the New
Deal, particularly in the last thirty years. From crime to occupational safety to the
environment, federal law pervasively governs private conduct that generally was
subject only to state control for the United State's first 150 years. Consequently,
the degree to which federal law is understood to displace state law addressing the
same subject is of vital importance to the breadth and significance of states'
residuary powers. As Justice Breyer recently noted:
[I]n today's world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of federalist
principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress'
commerce power at the edges, or to protect a State's treasury from a private
damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases where courts interpret
the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.64
57 For instance, a section of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
provides that the Act "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § I 144(a) (1998).58 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).59 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
60 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
61 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992);
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992).62Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
63 See, e.g., Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 (1997) ("When pre-emption of state
law is at issue, we must respect the 'principles [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism
in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal
law."') (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1990)); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court has participated in maintaining
the federal balance through judicial exposition of... the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption.");
Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000).
64Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 121 S. Ct. 1322, 1335 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The more readily courts find conflict between federal and state law, the
greater the power of the federal government to establish exclusive policy in a
given field, and the smaller the domain in which states can exercise their own
political judgment. A Supreme Court intent on protecting the states' status as co-
equal sovereigns-on reinvigorating the independent role of the states in light of
the dramatic expansion of federal law since the New Deal-might therefore be
expected to find such conflicts less frequently, hence narrowing preemption's
scope.
Yet the Rehnquist Court has done no such thing.65 First, the Court has not
altered the formal law of preemption in a manner that would enhance states'
political autonomy. Instead, it has left the doctrine that it inherited largely intact.
This is perhaps most surprising with respect to implied "obstacle" preemption.
Even where federal and state law could be construed as complementary, and
where Congress has been silent with respect to its intent to displace state
regulation, the doctrine of obstacle preemption empowers courts to infer from a
federal statute's implicit objectives or overall structure an unstated congressional
intent to displace state law. This gives the judiciary broad discretion to nullify
exercises of traditional state police powers, and therefore has far-reaching
implications for federalism. 66 It has also been the subject of substantial scholarly
criticism, both for its tenuous theoretical foundation 67 and for its failure to afford
sufficient respect for state sovereignty interests.68 Yet the Rehnquist Court has
continued to invoke obstacle preemption to set aside state regulation. Indeed, the
Court has held in all six cases raising obstacle preemption questions during the
61 See Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 66, 68 (2001) ("Strikingly, in recent terms, even as the Supreme Court has begun to prune
the scope of some federal powers, it has aggressively employed preemption doctrine to
immunize a variety of business activities from state regulation.").
66As Justice Kennedy observed in Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, "[a]
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives
would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts state law."
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
67See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 265-90 (2000) (arguing that
there is no constitutional basis for "obstacle" preemption); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and
Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69,71 (1988) ("obstacle" preemption
doctrine "forces the courts either to search quixotically for the 'spirit' of a statute, or to choose
between two doctrinally deficient theories of preemption").
68See, e.g., KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION 47, 56 (1991); S. Candice
Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 687 (1991)
("Federal preemption decisions impede the ability of those governmental bodies that are
structured to be most responsive to citizens' public values and ideas-state and local
governments-and have concomitantly undermined citizens' rights to participate directly in
governing themselves."); Wolfson, supra note 67, at 114 ("The current jurisprudence of
preemption ... fails to protect the political and judicial safeguards of federalism.").
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past two terms that the state laws at issue frustrated the purposes of federal law
and were therefore preempted.69
To the extent that the Rehnquist Court has altered preemption doctrine, those
changes appear to have modestly undermined state sovereignty. Consider the
Court's holdings concerning the impact of a federal statute's express preemption
clause on implied preemption analysis. In the 1992 case of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,70 which addressed whether the federal statutes governing cigarette
labeling and advertising preempt state common-law tort claims, the Court
indicated that the existence of an express preemption provision foreclosed implied
preemption:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the
enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that
provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority," "there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state
laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation. Such reasoning is a
variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute
71implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.
But only three years later, in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,72 the Court
backtracked, stating that Cipollone established no "categorical rule precluding the
co-existence of express and implied pre-emption."73 Rather, Cipollone "[a]t
best... supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses
implied preemption. 74 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp.,75 the Court
discarded this remaining "inference" left by Myrick, holding that the existence of
an "express pre-emption provision imposes no unusual, 'special burden' against
pre-emption,' '76 and that "ordinary pre-emption principles" apply.77 As if to
extinguish any doubt, the Court stated this past term, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
69 See Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. at 1322 (2001); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 121
S. Ct. 1012 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v.
American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin,
529 U.S. 344 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
70505 U.S. 504 (1992).71Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), and
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (opinion of
Marshall, J.)) (citations omitted).
72514 U.S. 280 (1995).731 Id. at 288.74 Id. at 289.
7'529 U.S. 861 (2000).761d. at 873.77Id. at 874.
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Legal Committee, 78 that "[t]o the extent respondent posits that anything other
than our ordinary pre-emption principles apply" because Congress included an
express preemption provision, "that contention must fail. 79
In recent terms, the Court has also slightly narrowed its traditional
presumption against preemption, or at least clarified the presumption's contours
in a way that makes preemption more likely. Since at least its 1947 decision in
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,80 the Court has consistently stated that there is a
"presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally
regulated by the States," such that the Court will assume "that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'"
The Rehnquist Court has continued to endorse this starting point for
preemption analysis, invoking it on several occasions.82 But the Court has
recently emphasized the presumption's negative implication: where the subject is
one that the states have not traditionally regulated, the presumption does not
apply. For instance, United States v. Locke83 involved regulations imposed by the
State of Washington on oil tankers traveling in Puget Sound.84 Unanimously
concluding that the state regulations were preempted by the Federal Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, the Court underscored that "an assumption of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been
a history of significant federal presence., 85 This past term, the Court held in
Buclnan that state tort actions based on the defendant's fraudulent disclosures to
the Food and Drug Administration were preempted by the Food Drug and
78 121 S. Ct. 1012 (2001).
791Id. at 1019. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001), one of the last
decisions of the 2000 Term, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "an express definition of
the pre-emptive reach of a statute... supports a reasonable inference... that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt other matters." Id. at 2414 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S.
280, 288 (1995)). Justice O'Connor ultimately found that the state law was preempted. Id. This
statement seems to contradict the quoted language from Buclanan of only four months earlier,
which Justice O'Connor herself joined. The precise state of the law on this point is therefore
unclear. At a minimum, the Court has discarded the reasoning of Cipollone, and the more
considered discussions of the point in Geier and Buclanan seem of greater import than the
dictum in Lorillard.
80331 U.S. 218 (1947).
8 Califomia v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at
230).
82 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2414 (2001); Egelhoff v.
Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 121 S. Ct. 1322, 1330 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
83 529 U.S. 89 (2000).84Seeid. at 97, 117-19.851Id. at 90.
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Cosmetic Act. 6 Even though the Court in several previous preemption decisions
had recognized that states have "great latitude" to "exercise[ ] their police powers
to protect the health and safety of their citizens,""7 the Court emphasized in
Buckman that "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which
the States have traditionally occupied."' 8 Consequently, "no presumption against
pre-emption obtain[ed]. ' 9
Perhaps more tellingly, the Court has not applied preemption doctrine in a
manner particularly protective of state sovereignty. A rough statistical analysis
illustrates the point. Since the October 1991 Term, when Justice Thomas was
confirmed and the so-called "new federalism" majority was formed, the Court has
decided twenty cases in which it purported to resolve a split of authority among
lower courts as to whether federal law preempted the type of state law at issue.90
(A split among lower courts is at least a decent indication that the case is a close
one, with plausible arguments both for and against preemption.) In twelve of
those twenty cases, the Court held that the relevant state laws were entirely
preempted,9' and in two others the Court found that state law was partly
preempted.92 Since 1998, the pattern has been starker. Even as the Court has
rendered some of its most significant decisions concerning the federalism-based
limits on Congress' authority, such as Board of Trustees v. Garrett,93 United
86Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 121 S. Ct. 1012, 1020 (2001).
17 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88Buckman, 121 S. Ct. at 1017 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).89id.
90 Those cases are Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001); Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001); Buckman, 121 S. Ct. 1012; Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344
(2000); El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S.
911 (1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519
U.S. 213 (1997); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470; Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517
U.S. 735 (1996); Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645
(1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); U.S. Dept. of
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993);
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S.
88 (1992). This list may exclude additional preemption cases where the Court resolved a split of
authority but did not acknowledge the split in its opinion.
9t See Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2404; Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. at 1322; Buckman, 121 S. Ct. at
1012; Geier, 529 U.S. at 861; Norfolk Southern, 529 U.S. at 344; El A IIsraelAirlines, 525 U.S.
at 155; Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833; Smiley, 517 U.S. at 735; Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 25; Fabe,
508 U.S. at 491; Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 125; Gade, 505 U.S. at 88.92 See Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658; Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
93121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
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States v. Morrison,9 4 and Alden v. Maine,95 it has found preemption in all six
cases resolving lower-court disagreements.96
The state policy choices displaced in these cases have not been trivial. Some
have involved state laws that the Court itself has characterized as lying near the
core of the states' independent sovereignty. For instance, in Boggs v. Boggs,97 the
Court addressed whether ERISA preempted an aspect of Louisiana's community
property law that allowed a spouse who is not a plan participant to transfer, by
testamentary instrument, her interest in undistributed pension plan benefits.98
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the "central role
community property laws play in the nine community property States," 99 and that
"Louisiana's community property laws, and the community property regimes
enacted in other States, implement policies and values lying within the traditional
domain of the States."' 00 Nonetheless, the Court held that the Louisiana law was
preempted because it undermined "ERISA's solicitude for the economic security
of surviving spouses.''°
Other preempted laws have expressed the sort of moral judgment that is
central to a polity's independence. At issue in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council'o2 was a Massachusetts selective purchasing law that made it more
difficult for firms doing business in Burma to be awarded state public contracts.
The law required state agencies, in evaluating competing bids, to increase by ten
percent the price of offers made by firms that did more than a threshold level of
business in Burma.'0 3 It was an attempt by the people of Massachusetts to avoid
"collaborating with evil"-to prevent the use of their own tax dollars to support,
94529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9'527 U.S. 706 (1999).
96See Lorillard Tobacco, 121 S. Ct. at 2404; Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. at 1322; Buckman, 121
S. Ct. at 1020; Geier, 529 U.S. at 861; Norfolk S. Ry., 529 U.S. at 344; ElAI IsraelAirlines, 525
U.S. at 155.
17 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
981d. at 835-36.
99Id. at 840.
101 Id at 843; see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
(holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempted an Illinois scheme for
licensing workers at hazardous waste facilities even though "the States have a compelling
interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to
protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions") (quoting
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
'02530 U.S. 363 (2000).
'°3See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
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even indirectly, a Burmese regime notorious for its human rights abuses.'04 Yet
the Supreme Court unanimously held that the separate sanctions against Burma
enacted by Congress impliedly preempted the Massachusetts law.'05 The Court
could easily have seen the federal sanctions and the Massachusetts law as
complements; there was no serious contention that the laws actually conflicted,
and the Massachusetts law only governed the Commonwealth's proprietary
activity of purchasing goods and services.'0 6 Nonetheless, the Court construed the
purposes of the federal sanctions quite broadly, and it saw the Massachusetts law
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' full objectives" of giving the
President discretion to control sanctions against Burma, limiting the sanctions to
American firms, and creating a multilateral strategy.'0 7 The Court effectively
inferred from Congress' enactment of a particular set of sanctions an intent to
preclude anything else. The implications of this logic for the residuary power of
the states are rather extraordinary.'0° Under Crosby's reasoning, every state law
that concerns a foreign nation-such as the South African divestiture laws of the
1980s, or even a state's decision to invest its pension funds in a "socially
responsible" mutual fund-is preempted once the federal government has taken
action (or even expressly decided not to take action) addressing the same country.
None of this is to say that the Court reached the wrong result in these cases,
or that its approach to preemption is incompatible with its decisions concerning
the limits on congressional authority. Moreover, because each preemption case
turns on the specific language and structure of the federal statute at issue, the
result in any particular case may be unrelated to the Court's vision of the proper
federal-state balance. My point is only that, unlike the Rehnquist Court's
decisions enforcing the federalism-based limits on Congress, its approach to
preemption clearly has not emphasized the importance of the states' status as co-
equal sovereigns. The Court has not altered preemption doctrine to provide
greater protection to states' interests, nor has it applied that doctrine in a manner
tending to preserve state autonomy. If anything, its preemption jurisprudence
seems to have placed greater priority on the vindication of federal policy
'04 See Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189, 2191 (2001) ("Generating the
Massachusetts Act was, presumably, a repulsion by the people of Massachusetts, as represented
by the legislature, at the prospect of collaborating even indirectly with the notably tyrannical
regime that currently controls Burma.").
'o'Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
'06 See Levinson, supra note 104, at 2192.
107 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74.
'o' Cf Levinson, supra note 104, at 2194 (contending that the Court's willingness to accept
the federal government's claim that vital national security interests were at stake, "and to use it
as the underlying basis for limiting the power of Massachusetts to cordon itself off from
collaboration with this evil regime, bespeaks a view of national power that is absolutely
astonishing").
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objectives than on protecting the states' capacity to exercise independent political
judgment.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The other primary federalism-based limit on state authority is the "dormant"
or "negative" Commerce Clause. On its face, the Commerce Clause is no more
than an affirmative grant of power to Congress: "The Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."'' 9 But since at least 1873," ° the Supreme
Court has understood the Clause "of its own force" to impose substantive
limitations on state laws affecting interstate commerce."' Specifically, the Court
has construed the Clause to forbid state regulation that: (1) discriminates against
interstate commerce, either expressly or in practical effect, unless the state has no
other means to accomplish its legitimate objectives; (2) places an undue burden
on interstate commerce-that is, a burden that outweighs the putative benefits to
the state; or (3) attempts to regulate conduct beyond the state's borders." 2 Unlike
preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause negates state laws absent any federal
legislation. It empowers courts to strike down state laws based purely on the
Clause's negative implication.
The dormant Commerce Clause has long been the subject of controversy, and
it has been recently the object of scathing attacks from Justices Scalia and
Thomas, both of whom view the doctrine as illegitimate. To Justice Scalia, the
negative Commerce Clause "is 'negative' not only because it negates state
regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the
Constitution."' He believes that there is no "clear theoretical underpinning for
judicial 'enforcement' of the Commerce Clause,"' 14 that "[t]he historical record
provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it
says-an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce,""' 5 and that the
Court's "applications of the doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the
'
09 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
" See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
"'Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638,
642 (1984).
112 Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
1 10 YALE L.J. 785, 788-89 (2001).
... Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
14 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"1Id. at 263.
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matter, made no sense."' 16 Similarly, Justice Thomas. has stated that "[t]he
negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes
little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application."' 17 Not only are
"the underlying justifications for [the Court's] involvement in the negative aspects
of the Commerce Clause ... illusory," but the Court's jurisprudence in the area
"undermines the delicate balance in what we have termed 'Our Federalism."'' 8
These missives have not appeared in opinions for the Court, however, but in
separate concurrences or dissents. As with preemption, the Rehnquist Court has
done nothing to alter dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in a manner that would
provide greater protection for state sovereignty. Indeed, the Court has rejected
several invitations from state litigants to revise the law in the area to afford states
greater leeway to pursue their own policy choices. For instance, in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota,"9 North Dakota asked the Court to overturn its 1967 decision,
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 120 which had held that
states cannot require out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes on sales to the taxing
state's residents if the seller has no physical presence in the taxing state.' 2'
Changed circumstances arguably rendered the physical presence requirement
obsolete. Advances in computer technology had made it much easier for sellers to
collect use taxes on interstate sales, the Court had abandoned the physical
presence requirement in its personal jurisdiction cases-instead requiring only
that the defendant have "purposefully availed" itself of the jurisdiction, and the
dramatic growth of the mail-order industry had increased the rule's financial
burden on states in terms of lost tax revenue.'22 Still, in an 8-1 decision, the Court
sustained Bellas Hess. 23 Conceding that the physical presence requirement was
"artificial at its edges," the Court reasoned that this "artificiality" was outweighed
by the benefits of reduced litigation, settled expectations-which would "foster[ ]
investment by businesses and individuals"--and respect for the "substantial
reliance" on the rule, which "has become part of the basic framework of a sizable
16Id. at 260; see also id. at 265 (the Court's enforcement of the dormant Commerce
Clause has been "an enterprise that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even
coherent nontextual theory, that it was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has
not undertaken very well"). See generally Walter Hellerstein, Justice Scalia and the Commerce
Clause: Reflections of a State Tax Lawyer (The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia), 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1763 (1991).
117Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
...Id. at 612; see also id. at 618 (Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause "to make
policy-laden judgments that we are ill equipped and arguably unauthorized to make").
"9 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
120386 U.S. 753 (1967).
'
211d. at 758-60.
112Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-04.
12 31d. at 314-19.
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industry."'124 To the Court, these practical benefits were of greater constitutional
weight than the states' ability to close a large loophole in their sales tax
structures-a loophole that now is of sizable significance given the growth of
commerce over the Internet. 2 '
In Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,126 the State of New
Jersey-supported by many states appearing as amici curiae-asked the Court to
discard an aspect of its framework for analyzing state income taxes imposed on
out-of-state businesses. Under established precedent, a state could tax an
apportioned share of an out-of-state taxpayer's income so long as that income was
earned as part of the taxpayer's "unitary business" operating in the taxing state.
121
Conversely, a state could not tax income derived from discrete business activities
that were unrelated to the taxpayer's activities in the state. 128 New Jersey argued
in Allied-Signal that this "unitary business principle" was an unjustified restraint
on states' taxing power; it ignored economic reality because common ownership
itself creates a flow of value between the different aspects of a business. 129 New
Jersey therefore asked the Court to hold that all income earned by an out-of-state
business could be taxed on an apportioned basis by a state in which the taxpayer
did business. 3° But, as in Quill, the Court adhered to its dormant Commerce
Clause precedent-in this case unanimously.13 1 It reasoned that New Jersey had
124Id. at 315-17.
25
'Presently, the Federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1101-04,
112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998), prohibits states from imposing any "multiple or discriminatory
taxes on electronic commerce." Id. § 1101 (a)(2). But requiring out-of-state sellers to collect use
taxes on interstate sales would be neither a multiple nor a discriminatory tax as it would merely
extend the existing tax burden on in-state sales to all retailers regardless of their physical
location. Walter Hellerstein, Internet Tax Freedom Act Limits States' Power to Tax Internet
Access and Electronic Commerce, 90 J. TAx'N 5 (1999). Thus, it is Quill that prevents states
from being able to apply their sales and use taxes equally to purchases from in-state and out-of-
state retailers. Wade Anderson & Christine Mozingo, Taxing Electronic Commerce, 20 ST.
TAX NOTES 521 (2000). A recent study estimated that the inability to tax sales from out-of-state
retailers with no physical presence in the taxing state will cost state and local governments
$13.3 billion in foregone tax revenue in 2001, $45.2 billion in 2006, and $54.8 billion in 2011.
Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, State and Local Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce:
Updated Estimates, 22 ST. TAX NOTES 203, 203 (200 1).
126504 U.S. 768 (1992).
'
27 Id. at 772.
'
2 8Id. at 773.
'
29 Id. at 784.
30 Id. at 777, 784.
131 Id. at 784-88. Four Justices dissented from the Court's decision in Allied-Signal, but the
dissenters agreed with the majority that the unitary business principle should be retained. Id. at
790 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that we cannot adopt New Jersey's
suggestion that the unitary business principle be replaced by a rule allowing a State to tax a
proportionate share of all the income generated by any corporation doing business there.").
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failed to demonstrate that the unitary business principle was either unsound in
principle or unworkable in practice. 
3 2
Most recently, the State of Alabama, in defending its discriminatory capital
stock tax, argued in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama133 that the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence represented "an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States...",134
and "should be abandoned.' 135 With respect to the federal-state balance, Alabama
contended that "the Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence simply
does not comport with the central axiom underlying our federal system"'136 that
"the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government,
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause."' 137 Because
Alabama had not raised this argument until it filed its brief on the merits, the
Court effectively treated it as waived and did not address it. 38 But Justice
O'Connor wrote a separate, two-sentence concurring opinion to note specifically
that "the State does nothing that would persuade me to reconsider or abandon our
well-established body of negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence."' 39
If the Rehnquist Court has altered dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, it
appears to have made federal encroachments on state sovereignty more likely.
Consider the broad conception of "facial discrimination" embraced by the Court
in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 40 which Justice Souter characterized in
dissent as "greatly extending the Clause's dormant reach."' 41 At issue was a "flow
control" ordinance enacted by the Town of Clarkstown, New York. which
required all solid wastes generated or brought into the municipality to be
processed at a designated transfer station in the city.' 42 The purpose was to
guarantee the facility sufficient revenue to pay for its construction. "43 The
ordinance did not favor local businesses as a class over out-of-state or nonlocal
competitors but instead granted a monopoly in waste processing to a specific local
transfer station. 44 The Court nevertheless held that the ordinance facially
discriminated against interstate commerce because the favored facility was a local
'12id. at 777-88.
133 526 U.S. 160 (1999).
134 Brief for Respondent at 7, S. Cent. Bell, 526 U.S. at 160 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v.
ThorMkins, 340 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).135 Brief for Respondent at 28, S. Cent. Bell Tel., 526 U.S. at 160.
136 Id. at 42.
"'Id. at 28.
138S. Cent. Bell, 526 U.S. at 171.39 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40511 U.S. 383 (1994).411d. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1421d. at 386.
1431d. at 387, 393.
144Id. at 402-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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one.141 "The only conceivable distinction" between this law and those drawing
explicit lines between in-state and out-of-state interests, the Court reasoned, "is
that the flow control ordinance favors a single local proprietor. But this difference
just makes the protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute.' 46
Several other Rehnquist Court decisions have also modified dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, albeit modestly, to make the displacement of state
regulation more likely. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison,147 the Court extended the scope of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
to include the state regulation of nonprofit organizations, striking down a Maine
property tax provision that disadvantaged charitable institutions predominantly
serving out-of-state residents. 148 In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State
Department of Revenue, 49 the Court extended its "internal consistency" test,
which it had previously applied to determine whether a state tax was fairly
apportioned, to its analysis of whether a state tax discriminated against interstate
commerce. 50 It thus found that, although Washington's Business and
Occupations Tax was fairly apportioned, it was nonetheless unconstitutional
because it was internally inconsistent. 5' In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Quality,"2 the Court articulated an extremely
stringent test that has made it virtually impossible, except in the rare case, for
states to justify taxes that discriminate against out-of-state residents on the ground
that they complement taxes imposed exclusively on state residents. 3 Applying
this test, the Court held that Oregon's higher surcharge on the disposal of out-of-
state waste could not be sustained as a complement to the burden of general
taxation imposed on in-state waste producers. 5 4 In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
1451Id. at 391.
146Id. at 392.
14'520 U.S. 564 (1997).
141ld. at 583-88, 595.
149483 U.S. 232 (1987).
"
01Id. at 241-42.
1 id. at 248, 251.
511 U.S. 93 (1994).153 Specifically, the Court stated:
To justify a charge on interstate commerce as a compensatory tax, a State must, as a
threshold matter, "identifly] ... the [intrastate tax] burden for which the State is attempting
to compensate." Once that burden has been identified, the tax on interstate commerce must
be shown roughly to approximate-but not exceed-the amount of the tax on intrastate
commerce. Finally, the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed
must be "substantially equivalent"; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in substance to
serve as mutually exclusive "prox[ies]" for each other.
Id. at 103 (citations omitted) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758 (1981); Armco
Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)).
'mId. at 104-05.
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Healy,1" the Court held that a Massachusetts combined tax and subsidy program
designed to aid the state's dairy industry was impermissible, even though both the
tax and the subsidy, had they been enacted separately, would likely have been
constitutional.,5 6 And in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner,57 the
Court overruled a long line of precedent to hold that a flat axle tax imposed on
truckers for the privilege of using the state's highways was unconstitutional. 58
This is not an exhaustive catalogue of the Rehnquist Court's dormant
Commerce Clause decisions, and certainly there are several cases in which this
Court has rejected such challenges.'59 Moreover, to the extent these decisions
have changed the relevant legal framework, they have only done so at the
margins. Still, it is clear that the Rehnquist Court has not been particularly
protective of state sovereignty interests. It has rejected invitations to rework its
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence so as to afford states greater autonomy
to pursue their own policy choices, and it has modestly altered the doctrine in the
direction of diminishing state sovereignty. As with preemption, the Court has
tended to be more interested in protecting the national economy from parochial
interference than in preserving states' political independence.
Thus, the notion that the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions have
uniformly-or even predominantly-protected state sovereignty at the expense of
competing national interests is a misconception. The so-called "federalism
revolution" has generally been confined to cases addressing the limits on
Congress' legislative powers, such as the breadth of the commerce power or the
restrictions imposed by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In the more
frequent disputes over the structural limits on state power, the Rehnquist Court
has regularly protected the national interests at stake, even when it has meant
displacing important expressions of states' political autonomy.
155512 U.S. 186 (1994).
"'Id. at 194-95, 199.
157483 U.S. 266 (1987).
"'Id. at 292-97 (overruling Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950), Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947), and Aero Mayflower
Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935)).
159See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995)
(upholding Oklahoma's unapportioned sales tax imposed on the purchase of bus tickets for
interstate travel); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (rejecting
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California's worldwide combined income reporting
system for affiliated corporations); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358
(1991) (sustaining Michigan's apportioned value added tax, even as applied to value added
through manufacturing activities that occurred outside the state); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir.,
Div. of Taxation, 490 U.S. 66 (1989) (upholding New Jersey's denial of deduction for federal
windfall profits tax imposed on oil producers even though taxpayers did not produce oil in New
Jersey); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (sustaining Illinois' unapportioned gross
receipts tax on all telecommunications that were billed to a service address in Illinois and were
initiated or terminated in the state).
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In this sense, Bush v. Gore is largely typical of how the Rehnquist Court has
balanced the imperative of protecting state sovereignty with the need to vindicate
the interests of the nation as a whole. The election dispute concerned the
consistency of a state judicial decision with the Equal Protection Clause and the
"Manner directed" Clause of Article 1-not the limits of Congress' legislative
authority. It therefore should not be especially surprising that this Court found the
national interests at stake-what it perceived as the fairness and reliability of the
presidential election result-more compelling than Florida's sovereignty interest
in resolving its own election controversy. Of course, this is not to say that the
Court's intervention was somehow predictable. But it is to say that Bush v. Gore
fits the Rehnquist Court's pattern of taking a slightly nationalistic approach to
federalism disputes that have not concerned the breadth of congressional power.
I1. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND THE POWER OF THE COURT
Again, the essence of the Rehnquist Court's so-called "new federalism" has
been a series of decisions reinvigorating the federalism-based limits on Congress'
enumerated powers. In the past ten years, the Court has imposed new constraints
on Congress' legislative authority both as to the subjects that it can regulate and
the means at its disposal. Keeping all else constant, these decisions have at least
modestly enhanced states' political independence. By limiting Congress'
authority to regulate interstate commerce and to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has preserved a broader range of private conduct that is
the exclusive domain of the states' police power. By forbidding Congress from
"commandeering" state legislatures or executive officials, the Court has protected
states from having to enact or implement federal regulatory programs against
their will. And by largely immunizing states from unconsented private suits for
money damages in both federal and state court, the Court has removed from
Congress a principal means for enforcing federal law against state governments.
But these decisions have not merely altered the relationship between the
federal government and the states. Less explicitly, they have also revised the
horizontal distribution of power among the branches of the federal government,
creating a larger role for the Court in our constitutional scheme.' 60 Only ten years
ago, the boundaries of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Eleventh
Amendment were left largely, if not entirely, to the political process. To the extent
the Court addressed such questions, its review was quite deferential, asking
generally whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the legislation
16°Kramer, supra note 20, at A13 (the Court's decision in Garrett is "but the latest
example of the court's assertion of the primacy of its views over those of Congress"); Rosen,
supra note 20, at 38 ("[T]he Rehnquist Court's federalism opinions are suffused with a refusal
to acknowledge Congress' legitimacy as a representative of national authority.").
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fell within its enumerated powers. The Rehnquist Court has replaced this
deference with independent and relatively aggressive scrutiny, asserting the
judiciary's supremacy in delineating the Constitution's boundaries between
federal and state power. In doing so, the Court has effectively removed several
constitutional judgments from the political process and made them matters for
judicial resolution.
Seen in this light, Bush v. Gore fits well with a central feature of the
Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence. Had the Court not intervened in the
election dispute, it appeared likely that Florida would have forwarded to Congress
competing slates of Bush and Gore electors. In deciding which electoral votes to
recognize, Congress then would have been forced to render its own judgment as
to whether the Florida Supreme Court's order to count the undervoted ballots
manually was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause and Article 11. Bush v.
Gore effectively foreclosed any such political resolution.' 6' As in many of its
recent federalism decisions, the Court saw itself as the appropriate institution to
provide the definitive constitutional answers, to the exclusion of democratic
politics.
A. State Autonomy or Judicial Supremacy?
1. Commerce Clause
Consider, first, the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause decisions. From
1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court's review of claims that federal legislation
exceeded the commerce power was extremely deferential to Congress-if the
Court exercised such review at all. Following the New Deal crisis, in the
watershed cases of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,162 United States v.
Darby,63 and Wikard v. Filburn,'64 the Court embraced a broad understanding
161 As Judge Posner has explained, the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore did not technically
remove from Congress the ultimate decision of whether to count Bush's electoral votes.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 185. Bush v. Gore did not command Congress to count the twenty-five
votes for Bush stemming from the November 26 vote totals certified by Florida Secretary of
State Katherine Harris. Thus, when Congress convened on January 6, 2001, it could have
rejected the twenty-five votes for Bush, giving Gore a majority (or perhaps a plurality) of the
electoral votes. Id. In fact, a group of House Democrats formally raised twenty objections to
Florida's votes, but because no Senator would sign onto their objections, they were not
cognizable under the Electoral Count Act. Edward Walsh & Juliet Eilperin, Gore Presides as
Congress Tallies Votes Electing Bush: Black Caucus Members Object as Fla. Numbers Are
Accepted, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2001, at Al. As a practical matter, however, Bush v. Gore did
remove the judgment from Congress as it eliminated any politically salient objection to the
Bush electors. POSNER, supra note 2, at 185-86.
16'301 U.S. 1 (1937).
113312 U.S. 100 (1941).
'64317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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of the commerce power (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause). The
relevant legal question was whether the regulated activity, when aggregated
across the national economy, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 65
Thus, even activities that were local and noncommercial in nature (such as
growing wheat for personal consumption) fell within the commerce power if, in
aggregate, they substantially affected the national economy. 1
66
More important for present purposes, the Court did not assess the regulated
activity's effect on interstate commerce independently of Congress' judgment.
Rather, the Court only asked whether Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that the activity had the requisite impact. 167 For instance, in Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 6 where the Court upheld the application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to motels, the Court framed the case as presenting only
two questions: "(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and
appropriate.' '169 Additionally, in Perez v. United States,7° the Court held that
Congress could regulate purely local loansharking activity because "[e]xtortionate
credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress
affect interstate commerce."' 7' Thus, the Court's role was decidedly modest.
What mattered was not the Court's independent view of the regulated activity's
effects on interstate commerce, but the reasonableness of Congress' judgment. As
the Court stated in Katzenbach v. McClung,'72 "where we find that the legislators,
in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.'
173
In fact, in the 1985 decision of Garcia v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority,174 the Court essentially held that the federalism-based limits on
Congress' legislative authority are not subject to judicial review at all. Garcia was
not itself a traditional Commerce Clause case, instead addressing the related issue
of states' immunity from federal regulation (in that case, the Fair Labor Standards
Act's minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements). 75 But the Court spoke
165 TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-4, at 811-16.
'66 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29; TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-4, at 813.
167 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 258.
168 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
1691d. at 258-59.
170402 U.S. 146 (1971).
'71 Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
172 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
.
73 Id. at 303-04.
174469 U.S. 528 (1985).
1751d. at 533.
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in broad terms about the respective roles of the Court and the political process in
policing the constitutional boundaries of federalism. It reasoned that the "principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.' 76 Consequently, "the
principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all
congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through
state participation in federal governmental action.' 17 7 Whether federal legislation
violated the Commerce Clause was therefore a political question. Congress and
the political process, not the Court, were to resolve the constitutional issues. 1
78
The Rehnquist Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez' 79 and United
States v. Morrison8° have overruled the rationale of Garcia, repudiating its
reliance on the "political safeguards" of federalism.'' In Lopez, the Court struck
down a federal statute as exceeding Congress' commerce power for the first time
since 1936, declaring the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional.
82
Morrison held that the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women
Act, which permitted the victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their
attackers for damages, also went beyond the authority conferred by the
Commerce Clause. 83 In reaching these results, the Court stated, in no uncertain
terms, that it is the judiciary's responsibility to police the federalism-based limits
on congressional authority. While "the political branches have a role in
interpreting and applying the Constitution," since Marbury v. Madison,'1 4 the
Supreme Court "has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.' ', 85
Indeed, it is "a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
,,186 brConstitution. The breadth of Congress' commerce power is therefore
"ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by this Court."'8 7
Not only did Lopez and Morrison emphasize the centrality of the Court's role
in determining the breadth of the commerce power, but they declined to defer to
176Id. at 550.
177Id. at 556.
178 See id. ("The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not
be promulgated.").
179514 U.S. 549 (1995).
"8 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
181 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 So. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1334 (1997).
182 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
1' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19.
184 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
185 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.186Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
187Id, at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2).
18072001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Congress' own judgment as to the regulated activity's effect on interstate
commerce. At no point in either opinion did the Court ask whether Congress had
a rational basis for determining that the relevant activities substantially affected
interstate commerce. Rather, the analysis in both cases proceeded from the
assumption that this was a decision for the Court de novo. More pointedly, the
Court in Morrison rejected Congress' extensive findings concerning the effects of
gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. Based on four years of
hearings, eight committee reports, twenty-one state task force reports, and
thousands of pages of data,188 Congress concluded that:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce ... , by diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the
supply of and the demand for interstate products.
1 89
But the Court found that these findings were "substantially weakened by the fact
that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected
as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers."' 90
It therefore dismissed the findings as irrelevant. 9'
In addition, the malleability of the doctrine created by the Rehnquist Court
for evaluating Commerce Clause questions has given the Court fairly broad
discretion in passing on the validity of federal legislation. Specifically, the Court's
application of the "substantial effects" test in Lopez and Morrison did not actually
address whether the regulated activities, as an empirical matter, substantially
affected interstate commerce. (In truth, every activity that Congress would bother
to regulate-including gun possession near schools and gender-motivated
violence-has a substantial effect on interstate commerce as that phrase is
commonly understood.)' 92 Instead, the Court has used the "substantial effects"
heading to take up two other inquiries: (1) whether the regulated activity is
'
8 8 See id. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'"
89Id. at 634 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
'
90Id. at 615.
19 11d.
192 The Court effectively conceded this point in both Lopez and Morrison. In both
opinions, after reciting the government's contentions as to why the regulated activity
substantially affected interstate commerce, the Court responded by stating that accepting the
government's position would mean that there were no judicially enforceable limits on the
commerce power. See id. at 615-16; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-66 (1995).
Conspicuously, the Court never disputed the government's empirical arguments that gun
possession near schools and gender-motivated violence have substantial impacts on interstate
commerce.
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"commercial" or "economic in nature,"'193 and (2) whether the regulation of that
activity has historically "been the province of the States."' 94 Measured by these
standards, the Court found the legislation in Lopez and Morrison invalid because
neither gun possession near schools nor gender-motivated violence is, "in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity,"' 95 and "the suppression of violent crime"
is an essential aspect of the police power.
19 6
These standards, however, are rather vague and capacious. Consider the
Court's recent decision in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers.'97 There, the Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance to
construe the Clean Water Act as not reaching isolated, non-navigable ponds, and
thus invalidated the Army Corps of Engineers' so-called "migratory bird rule."'
' 98
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that if the Act were construed to reach such
waters, it would raise a serious question as to whether Congress had exceeded its
commerce power, as it "would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use.' ' 99 It is unclear, however,
why the Court saw the province of the migratory bird rule as "land and water use"
rather than "environmental protection," an area that historically has been as much
the responsibility of Congress as of the states. By the same token, it is unclear
why the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act fell within
the province of "the suppression of violent crime" rather than the "protection of
civil rights," a domain in which the federal government (dating to the Civil War)
has historically taken the lead.
Further, it is uncertain what makes an activity "commercial" or "economic"
in nature.2°° Common definitions of "economic" include: (1) "[o]f or relating to
the production, development, and management of material wealth;" (2) "[o]f or
relating to the practical necessities of life;" and (3) "[f]inancially rewarding. 201
Almost any activity that Congress might regulate could fit one of these
descriptions. Certainly, possessing a firearm near a school or filling in wetlands
might plausibly be characterized as "relating to the practical necessities of life" or
"financially rewarding." Indeed, the plaintiff in Solid Waste Agency intended to
fill the isolated ponds on its property to develop a commercial waste disposal
site.202
93 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
1941d. at 618.
"'
9 Id. at 613.
'96Id. at 618.
197531 U.S. 159 (2001).
'
9 Id. at 172-74.
'
99 Id. at 174.
200 See Lessig, supra note 17, at 205-06.
20 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 583 (3d ed. 1992).
202 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 163.
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To be sure, the narrowing of Congress' commerce power effected by Lopez
and Morrison should not be overstated: Congress retains broad authority to
regulate most realms of private conduct in the United States.203 Still, the Court's
decisions represent an important shift in the respective roles played by the Court
and Congress in defining this constitutional boundary. The Rehnquist Court has
determined that the judiciary alone is entitled to determine the breadth of
Congress' commerce power; it has refused to defer to Congress' judgment
concerning the regulated activity's effect on interstate commerce; and it has
created a doctrinal framework that gives the Court broad discretion to determine
the validity of federal legislation. In each respect, the Court has replaced a regime
that relied largely on the political process to resolve the relevant constitutional
questions with one in which the Court plays the principal role.
2. Tenth Amendment
The Rehnquist Court's decisions addressing the Tenth Amendment follow a
similar pattern. After the 1930s, the Supreme Court for many years understood
the Tenth Amendment to "state[ ] but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered., 20 4 In other words, the amendment generally imposed no
independent constraints on Congress' legislative authority beyond those inherent
in the limited scope of Congress' enumerated powers. As the Court stated in
United States v. Darby:
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it
had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers.
205
In 1976, the Court briefly revived the Tenth Amendment as an independent
constraint on congressional authority in National League of Cities v. Usery, °6
holding that states enjoy an immunity from federal regulation "in areas of
203See Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts,
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 132, 142 (2001) ("Despite the clamor over the
Court's new federalism doctrine, it has in fact only modestly trimmed congressional power.");
Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1127, 1129 (2001) ("[lIt remains unclear just how significant a reduction in the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause power these recent precedents portend.").
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).205 Id.
206426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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traditional governmental functions." 207 But Garcia overruled National League of
Cities only nine years later, ruling that Congress could enforce the NLRA's
minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements against the states.208 More
broadly, Garcia held that the judiciary had no role in enforcing the limits imposed
on Congress by the Tenth Amendment. The independent sovereignty of the states
is "more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."209
Again, the Rehnquist Court has rejected Garcia's basic premise-that the
Constitution leaves enforcement of the boundaries of constitutional federalism to
the political process.210 What Lopez and Morrison have done in establishing the
Court's central role in determining the breadth of the commerce power, New York
v. United States21 and Printz v. United States212 have done in establishing the
same role for the Court in enforcing the Tenth Amendment. In New York, the
Court held that the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments of 1985, which directed states either to regulate low-level
radioactive waste according to specific federal directives or take title to the waste
generated within their borders, exceeded Congress' powers. 213 Although
Congress could regulate the disposal of radioactive waste itself, it could not
"commandeer[ ] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. '214 In Printz, the Court
likewise struck down an aspect of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of
1995 that required local law enforcement officers to perform background checks
on all handgun purchasers.21 5 Just as Congress cannot compel state legislatures to
enact federal programs, it "cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
States' officers directly., 216 New York and Printz have thus established, contra
Garcia, that the Tenth Amendment imposes independent limits on Congress'
legislative authority that, like the limits of the commerce power, must be enforced
by the Court.
Whatever one thinks of this anti-commandeering principle, 2 7 these decisions
have plainly given the Court an authority that previously rested with Congress.
207 Id. at 852.
208 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985).
209Id. at 552.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 176-84.
21'505 U.S. 144 (1992).
212521 U.S. 898 (1997).213New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
2 141d. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).215Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
2 16 Id. at 935.
217 There are many varying views. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the
Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 168 (2001)
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Much like Lopez and Morrison, New York and Printz have replaced deference to
the political process with independent judicial review. In fact, the Court's
opinions in both cases expressly questioned the capacity of elected officials to
abide by the Constitution's structural boundaries. The Court in New York
reasoned that:
[P]owerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view
departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most
citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want
sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be well within the authority of
either federal or state officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is
likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held
accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If a federal official is faced
with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the
official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the
eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives-
choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location-the state
official may also prefer the latter, as it may pernit the avoidance of personal
responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the
Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority.
The Court's analysis in Printz was similar. Revealing a deep skepticism
about the ability of the political process to adhere to constitutional norms, the
Court stated that any leeway afforded Congress might well be used cynically to
accomplish unpopular policy objectives while eluding political responsibility:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for
the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced
to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the
position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.... Under
the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not some federal official
who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun.
(supporting the results in New York and Printz but arguing that "considerations of state
sovereignty justify some enforceable rule other than an anti-commandeering rule"); Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2246-59 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and
Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 815, 819
(1994) (endorsing the anti-commandeering principle, but arguing that it is rooted in the
Guarantee Clause and "the notion of republican government"); Donald H. Regan, How to Think
About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 554, 593 (1995) (defending the anti-commandeering principle but assigning it to
the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the Tenth Amendment).
2
.. New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83.
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And it will likely be the CLEO, not some federal official, who will be blamed for
any error (even one in the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to
be mistakenly rejected.2t9
These passages seem to epitomize the Rehnquist Court's view of Congress
and the political process as arbiters of the constitutional balance between federal
and state power.220 Rather than seeing Congress as a co-equal branch that is
equally charged with the obligation to interpret the Constitution,22 ' the Rehnquist
Court has evinced a fair measure of distrust. In the eyes of the Court, Congress'
political accountability, instead of being an asset, undermines its institutional
capacity to resolve these questions of constitutional federalism in a principled
fashion. By holding that the judiciary is the ultimate expositor of the meaning of
the Tenth Amendment, the Rehnquist Court has again enhanced its own role in
resolving disputes over constitutional meaning.
3. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Probably the most prominent example of the Rehnquist Court's assertion of
the judiciary's primacy in determining the boundaries of Congress' power has
been its decisions construing section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. S ection 5
grants Congress the authority "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of' the Fourteenth Amendment,223 the most significant of these
provisions being the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Before 1997, the
precise contours of Congress' section 5 power were unsettled.224 Yet it was
2
.Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
220 The Justices have expressed similar views in their unofficial capacities. At an academic
symposium in April 2000, Justice Scalia reportedly commented:
Congress is increasingly abdicating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being
faithful to the Constitution .... My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to
the Court with the presumption of constitutionality.... But if Congress is going to take the
attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about
the Constitution... then perhaps that presumption is unwarranted.
Stuart Taylor Jr., The Tipping Point, NAT'L J., June 10, 2000, at 1810-11.
221 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives... of the United
States ... shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.").
222 According to Jeffrey Rosen: "the most distinctive quality of the conservative justices of
the Rehnquist Court seems to be a general disdain for the political branches-for Congress, for
the president, for the administrative agencies, even for juries." Rosen, supra note 20, at 42; see
also Karlan, supra note 9, at 97 ("'The most notable thing about the newest equal protection and
the enforcement clause, however, is the Court's repeatedly articulated skepticism of Congress'
motives and its competence.").
223 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.224 See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1147 (noting that the scope of permissible ends that
Congress could pursue under its section 5 power was arguably ambiguous before 1997).
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evident that, under existing precedent, the Court would afford Congress broad
deference in the use of its section 5 authority.
25
First, as to the permissible ends of section 5, the Court's precedent before
1997 established that Congress was not limited to prohibiting only that conduct
which the judicial branch was prepared to declare unconstitutional.226 As the
Court stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan,227 a "construction of § 5 that would
require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by
Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. '22 Moreover, the
Court's prior decisions suggested that, in using its section 5 power, Congress
might have the authority to interpret the substantive prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment independently of the judiciary.229 That is, Congress potentially could
enact legislation enforcing its understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,
regardless of the Court's interpretations in case law. The idea was not that
Congress could change the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by ordinary
legislation.230 But, as a branch of the national government coequal with the Court,
Congress could reach an independent interpretive conclusion and ascribe a
different meaning to the text in enacting enforcement legislation pursuant to
section 5.3
Second, with respect to the permissible means and justifications for section 5
legislation, the law as of 1997 was quite clear, and the Court's approach was
likewise decidedly deferential.232 Dating to the 1879 decision of Ex parte
Virginia,233 the standard for assessing whether section 5 legislation was
"appropriate" had been the same as that governing whether legislation enacted
225 See id. at 1134-43.226 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,648 (1966).
227 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
228Id. at 648.
229See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997) ("There is language in our
opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), which could be interpreted as
acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § I
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
210See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, I I HARV. L. REV. 153, 171 (1997) (under this view, "Congress is not free to
pass legislation based solely on its legislative judgment about what rights people should have,
but is limited to good faith interpretations of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, just as
the judiciary is").
23 See id.; John Yoo, Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process and the Wages
ofJudicial Supremacy, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1436, 1455 (2000).
232 See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1141-43.
... 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
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pursuant to any of Congress' Article I powers was "Necessary and Proper. 2 34
This is the standard famously articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, [sic] and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, [sic] are constitutional., 23' As has long been recognized, this is a
quite relaxed standard of means-ends scrutiny; Congress need not be precise in
tailoring its legislation to its legitimate objectives.236 Thus, in applying this
standard, the Court has never inquired into whether Congress had less restrictive
means available to accomplish its putative ends, nor has it asked whether the
problem that Congress sought to address was sufficiently serious to warrant
federal legislation. 37 Under Ex parte Virginia and Morgan, then, Congress'
discretion in determining the appropriateness of legislation to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment was equally broad. Any law "adapted to carry out the
objects the [Reconstruction] amendments have in view," or that "tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain," was "within the domain of
congressional power.',
238
In a series of decisions beginning in 1997 with City of Boerne v. Flores,239
the Rehnquist Court has rejected this deferential approach and adopted a more
restrictive view of Congress' authority under section 5.240 First, the Court has
emphatically held that only the judiciary can decree the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive prohibitions. As the Court succinctly stated
in Board of Trustees v. Garret?41 (in words reminiscent of Lopez and Morrison),
"it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees., 242 Because "[t]he ultimate interpretation and
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the
province of the Judicial Branch,, 243 Congress has no authority to read the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment differently than the Court.
This interpretive supremacy extends to determinations of the appropriate
legal framework for evaluating Fourteenth Amendment questions (e.g., the proper
2a4Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 ("[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure
of what constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").23 1Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819)).236See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934); Stephenson v.
Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 542 (1870);
Caniinker, supra note 203, at 1136-38.237 See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1136-40.
23 Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,345-46 (1879)).239 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
240See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1143-58.241 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
242 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963 (2001).
243 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
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standard of scrutiny for assessing particular types of state action), as well as the
application of that framework to the specific problem that Congress has sought to
remedy. Consider the Court's decisions in Garrett and Kimel v. Florida Board of
244 inoRegents, which involved the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), respectively.2 41 According to
the Court's prior decisions, neither disability nor age is a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.246 The Court has therefore
refused to strike down state discrimination on the basis of age or disability so long
as the state had a rational basis for its classification.247 One might have seen the
ADA and the ADEA as accepting this legal framework but nonetheless
expressing Congress' independent view that most instances of disability and age
discrimination are, in fact, irrational. But the Rehnquist Court conceded no such
authority to Congress in Garrett or Kimel. The relevant question was whether
these forms of discrimination were irrational under the Court's precedent.
248
Because the Court itself had previously held that disability and age discrimination
were "entirely rational (and therefore constitutional)" in most circumstances,
249
Congress could not take a contrary view.25 °
'4 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
245The precise question in both cases was whether Congress had validly abrogated states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from unconsented private suits for damages. See Garrett, 121
S. Ct. at 960; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-67. But because the Court held, in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that Congress could accomplish such abrogation only pursuant to
its section 5 power, the essential question in both cases was whether the laws were justifiable
exercises of Congress' section 5 authority. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.246 See Clebume v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (disability);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam) (age).147 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 (holding that legislation discriminating on the basis of
disability "incurs only the minimum 'rational-basis' review applicable to general social and
economic legislation"); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 ("States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.").241 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 (assessing whether instances of alleged disability
discrimination in the ADA's legislative record "were irrational under our decision in
Cleburne").
249 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 ("Age classifications, unlike
governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so seldom relevant
to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."') (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
250 As Walter Dellinger and Jonathan Hacker have explained, this approach to section 5
questions arguably turns the original justification for the rational basis test on its head. See
Walter Dellinger & Jonathan Hacker, 14th Amendment Is Real Issue in Federalism Cases,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at A28. The judiciary devised rational basis scrutiny largely to afford
legislatures broad deference in drawing classifications that do not involve "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" groups; absent classifications based on race, gender, ethnicity, or the like, courts will
defer to the legislature's judgment if it can be called rational. See id. In its section 5 decisions,
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Second, the Rehnquist Court's decisions have clearly broken with precedent
by demanding a relatively tight means-ends fit in section 5 legislation, overruling
the more relaxed standard of Ex parte Virginia and Katzenbach v. Morgan.25'
Specifically, the Court has held "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. '252 In applying this "congruence and proportionality" test, the Court has
imposed two distinct requirements. First, a substantial percentage of the conduct
regulated or prohibited by section 5 legislation must be unconstitutional (again,
according to the Court's reading of the Constitution). Although "Congress' § 5
power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the
precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment," '253 it does not extend too far
beyond "the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question." 254 The
smaller the proportion of regulated activity that is unconstitutional, the less likely
the Court will find the legislation "congruent and proportional." 25 Thus, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), struck down by the Court in City of
Boerne, was problematic because "[i]n most cases, the state laws to which RFRA
applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry" and
thus unconstitutional.25 6 Similarly, the ADEA failed the "congruence and
proportionality" test in Kimel because it "prohibits substantially more state
employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."2 57 And the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison was
beyond Congress' section 5 power because it was directed exclusively at private
individuals who had committed acts of gender-motivated violence and thus did
not regulate any conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment itself proscribes. 8
By demanding that Congress not regulate or prohibit too much conduct that
the judiciary would find constitutional, the Rehnquist Court has imposed on
section 5 legislation something akin to a "narrow tailoring" requirement
however, the Rehnquist Court has used the rational basis test to severely restrict the powers of
Congress, requiring that Congress demonstrate not just widespread discrimination, but
irrational discrimination (and hence unconstitutional). See id.251 See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1143 (noting Rehnquist Court has "departed sharply
from the longstanding tradition of deferential means-ends scrutiny").252 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
253Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (2000).
254 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964.
...See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1154 ("In general, the greater the ratio of statutory
applications to actual constitutional violations proscribed, the more cause for concern.").256 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
257Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
258 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000).
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characteristic of intermediate or strict scrutiny.259 In effect, the Court has asked
whether Congress could have employed means that would impinge less on
constitutional conduct.260  Prior to 1997, such judgments about the
overinclusiveness of section 5 legislation were committed to Congress' discretion.
For instance, in upholding Congress' prohibition on literacy tests for voters
completing the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school, the Court reasoned in
Morgan that:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh
the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the
discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state
restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy
or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state
interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy
requirement as applied to residents who have successfully completed the sixth
grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.261
In replacing this deference with a more rigorous, less-restrictive-means scrutiny,
the Rehnquist Court has removed these judgments from the realm of democratic
politics and made them matters for the judiciary.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court's application of the "congruence and
proportionality" test has also required Congress to justify its invocation of the
section 5 power by demonstrating that it had identified a sufficient number of
constitutional violations. In other words, for legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment to be "appropriate," Congress must have documented "a history of
'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights.' 2 62 Thus, the
Court found the Patent Remedy Act wanting in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank2 63 because "the record at best
259See TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-16, at 959 (describing the standard as "something
between intermediate and strict scrutiny"); McConnell, supra note 230, at 166 (explaining City
of Boerne replaced "something akin to 'rational basis scrutiny' with a narrow tailoring
requirement typical of intermediate scrutiny"); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Equal
Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (observing the Rehnquist Court has used "the congruence and
proportionality test to fasten tight restrictions on the exercise of otherwise legitimate section 5
legislation, restrictions that seem analogous to the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny").
26°See Caminker, supra note 203, at 1155 (noting that this aspect of the congruence and
proportionality test "impose[s] a presumptive 'less restrictive alternative' requirement").261Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,653 (1966).
262 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645
(1999) (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
263 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that States were depriving patent
owners of property without due process of law."2' 6 The Court held in Kimel that
the ADEA could not be justified as an exercise of the section 5 power because
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much
less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation.',2 6 And the Court concluded in Garrett that the ADA was not
appropriate section 5 legislation because "[t]he legislative record of the
ADA... simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of
irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled. 2 66
By requiring Congress to demonstrate that the targeted "constitutional
problem" is genuine-that it rises to some level of sufficient magnitude-the
Rehnquist Court has made the need for particular statutory remedies a matter for
judicial judgment. If Congress has failed to document a pattern of widespread
constitutional violations, then section 5 legislation cannot be considered
"appropriate." Prior to City of Boerne, this was precisely the type of determination
that the Court left entirely to Congress. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause
(and thus Ex parte Virginia and Morgan), where "the means adopted are really
calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, [and] the extent to which
they conduce to the end... are matters for congressional determination alone. 267
As Chief Justice Marshall stated in McCulloch, "to inquire into the degree of [the
law's] necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground." 268
Thus, as in its cases addressing the commerce power and the Tenth
Amendment, the Rehnquist Court's section 5 decisions-particularly in their
application of the "congruence and proportionality" test-have substantially
augmented the role of the judiciary in policing the boundaries of federalism. The
Court has replaced deference to Congress' judgment as to the propriety of section
5 legislation with rigorous judicial review. In fact, in all six cases since 1997
where a federal law was challenged as being beyond Congress' section 5 power,
the Court has held that the statute was not appropriate enforcement legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 269 Hence, in addition to readjusting the balance
of power between the federal government and the states, the Rehnquist Court's
"new federalism" decisions have had a significant impact on the distribution of
authority between the judicial and legislative branches of the national
264Id. at 646.
265 Kinel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000).
266 Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 965 (2001).
267 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934).
268 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,423 (1819).269 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel,528 U.S. 62; Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
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government. They have made the judiciary the final arbiter of several
constitutional questions that were previously settled in the realm of democratic
politics.
B. Bush v. Gore Revisited
If the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution" has been as much about the
Court's supremacy in determining the meaning of the Constitution as about the
proper federal-state balance, then Bush v. Gore becomes the seminal case. For
when the political stakes were highest, and the risks to the Court's institutional
legitimacy the gravest, the Rehnquist Court decided that it was the Court's
responsibility to provide the definitive constitutional answers. As with the breadth
of Congress' enumerated powers, the constitutionality of Florida's election was to
be decided by the Court, not the political process.
A brief review of the events surrounding the election contest may be helpful.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on November 26, 2000, Florida Secretary of State
Katherine Harris declared George W. Bush the certified winner of Florida's
presidential election by the slim margin of 537 votes.270 The next day, Vice
President Gore filed suit in Leon County Circuit Court contesting the certified
totals, alleging (as is relevant here) that they excluded legal votes.27' Specifically,
Gore challenged Miami-Dade County's refusal to count its ballots manually;
Palm Beach County's failure to complete a manual count and its use of a more
stringent "intent" standard for evaluating uncounted ballots; and the exclusion of
legal votes identified by the partially completed manual counts in Miami-Dade
and Palm Beach Counties.2 72 Following a brief trial, Circuit Judge N. Sanders
Sauls rejected each of Gore's claims on December 4.273 Judge Sauls concluded
that Gore had failed to establish any illegality in the balloting or counting
processes, or that the alleged irregularities created a reasonable probability that
the election result would have been different.274 (Incidentally, also on December
170 See Todd S. Purdum, Bush Is Declared Winner in Florida, But Gore Vows to Contest
Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at Al.271 See David Firestone, Florida Judge Is Asked to Declare Gore the Winner, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
272 Complaint to Contest Election, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27,
2000), available at http://news.findlaw.com/enn/docs/election2000/goreelectcmplnt1I27.pdf.
Gore also contended that Nassau County, by submitting its original election night totals rather
than the results of its machine recount, had counted illegal votes. See id. But the Florida
Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260
(Fla. 2000), rev'd, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
273 See David Firestone, Gore Loses Florida Recount Case, Puts Last Hope in State High
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at Al.
274 Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1790621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2000), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev'd, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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4, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,275 which vacated and remanded the
Florida Supreme Court's decision concerning Gore's pre-certification protest
action.276 It was unclear how this first United States Supreme Court decision
affected Gore's now-initiated election contest, if at all.277)
Gore immediately appealed Judge Sauls' ruling to the Florida Supreme
Court, which set the case for argument on December 7.278 On Friday, December
8, a divided Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, ordering an
immediate manual count of all undervoted ballots in the state.279 The Florida
Supreme Court concluded that, under Florida election law, "a legal vote is one in
which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.' 280 Because Gore had
identified over 9000 ballots in Miami-Dade County that had not registered a vote
for president, he had established that "legal votes sufficient to place in doubt the
election results ha[d] been rejected., 28' Florida law therefore required a manual
count of the undervoted ballots, but it was "absolutely essential" that the count be
conducted in all counties in which there had been undervoted ballots, not just
those that Gore had contested.282 The court thus remanded the case to Leon
County Circuit Court to tabulate the legal votes contained in the Miami-Dade
undervotes (which were now in the circuit court's custody) and to issue such
orders as were necessary to carry out the statewide tabulation, with the governing
standard being a "clear indication of the intent of the voter. 283 It also ordered that
the legal votes identified by the partially completed manual counts in Miami-
Dade and Palm Beach counties be included in the certified totals. 284 The inclusion
of these votes reduced Bush's margin over Gore to somewhere between 150 and
200 votes.285
Later that night, Bush filed an emergency application with the United States
Supreme Court to stay the Florida Supreme Court's judgment.286 He argued that
275 531 U.S. 70 (2001) (per curiam).276 Id. at 478.
277 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Broad Virtue in a Modest Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2000,
at A29.
278 See David Firestone, Florida Supreme Court Moves Quickly to Hear Gore Contest of
Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A27.
279 See David Firestone, Florida Court Backs Recount; Bush Appealing to US. Justices,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al.
280Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 2000) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 101.5614(5) (West 2000)), rev'd, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).2811d.282 1d. at 1253.
2 3 Id. at 1262.
284 Id.
285See POSNER, supra note 2, at 121.
286Linda Greenhouse, Bush Had Sought Stay-Hearing Is Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2000, at A 1.
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the "selective, ever-shifting, and standardless hand-counting" of ballots "would
seriously erode fundamental federal policies, including the right to vote" and the
"fairness and finality of elections for federal office. 287 As Bush's application was
pending, hand counting of the roughly 45,000 undervoted ballots commenced
throughout Florida on Saturday moming.2" According to orders from Circuit
Judge Terry Lewis, eight county judges were evaluating the Miami-Dade ballots,
and other county canvassing boards were proceeding under individual plans
submitted to Judge Lewis. 289 By mid-afternoon, roughly thirteen of Florida's
sixty-seven counties had started or completed the manual counting of their
undervoted ballots.29° Election officials were under court order not to reveal the
results of these tabulations, but some observers were reporting that Gore was
making up significant ground, possibly reducing the overall margin to fewer than
100 votes. 29' Then, at 2:45 p.m., the United States Supreme Court issued its order
halting the manual count and granting certiorari, scheduling the case for argument
at 11:00 a.m. Monday, December 11.292
As these judicial proceedings were unfolding, the Florida legislature was
taking steps to appoint a separate slate of electors in the event Vice President
Gore ultimately prevailed in his election contest. As early as November 22,
Republican legislators began discussing the possibility of convening a special
session to name electors who would support Bush in the Electoral College,
superseding the results of the popular vote.293 That week, Florida House Speaker
Tom Feeney and Florida Senate President John McKay created a "Select Joint
Committee on the Manner of the Appointment of Presidential Electors," which
heard two days of testimony concerning the legislature's obligation to appoint its
own slate of electors.294 On November 30, the select committee recommended
that the legislature convene for this purpose "as soon as practicable., 295 A week
later, Feeney and McKay signed a joint proclamation calling for a special session,
287 Emergency Application for Stay, Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949 (Dec. 8, 2000), Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/election2000/
usscbushmotstay 1208.pdf.
288 Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, US. Supreme Court's Ruling Stops Florida's Election
Workers in Their Tracks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A43.
289 Filkens & Canedy, supra note 288, at A43; David Firestone, Supreme Court, Split 5-4,
Halts Florida Count in Blow to Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at Al.
210See Firestone, supra note 289, at Al.291 See id.; Filkins & Canedy, supra note 288, at A43.
292 Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (2000) (granting of stay and writ of certiorari).
293 David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Florida Legislators Consider Options to Aid Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at Al.
294 David Barstow, Florida Lawmakers Moving to Bypass Courts for Bush; Judge Bars a
Quick Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,2000, at A1.
295 See David Barstow, Lawmakers Move Closer to Special Session for Naming Bush
Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A27.
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which convened December 8.296 And on December 12, just hours before the
United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in Bush v. Gore, the Florida House
adopted a resolution appointing twenty-five Bush electors.297 The Florida Senate
was scheduled to vote on the resolution the next day, but McKay delayed any
action pending Gore's remarks that evening.298 The Vice President's concession
made the whole endeavor moot.
2 99
Thus, as the Justices deliberated over whether to intervene in the contest
proceeding-and, once they did, how to decide the case-the following scenario
lay before them: If the Court allowed the manual count to go forward, it appeared
likely that Gore would overtake Bush and be declared the winner of Florida's
popular vote. Indeed, this was precisely the irreparable harm that Justice Scalia
believed justified the Court's halting the manual count, as Gore's taking the lead
would have "cast[ ] a cloud upon what [Bush] claims to be the legitimacy of his
election., 30 0 Assuming Secretary Harris and Governor Jeb Bush abided by the
Florida Supreme Court's orders, Gore then would have been certified as the
winner of the state's twenty-five electoral votes.3 ' In response, or even if the
popular vote had not been settled by December 12, both houses of the Florida
legislature would have passed a resolution appointing twenty-five electors
pledged to support George W. Bush, and these electors too would have been
certified by the Secretary of State and the Governor. 30 2 Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment dictate that, after the states' electoral votes have been certified and
sent to Washington, "[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall
296 See Dana Canedy & David Barstow, Florida Lawmakers to Convene Special Session
Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A35.
297 See Dana Canedy, House Adopts Bush Electors, But Act May Be Moot, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2000, at A26.
291 See Dana Canedy, Oh, That Appointed Slate? Lawmakers Are Glad to Forget It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A30.
299 See id.
300Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (granting stay and writ of certiorari) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
301 But see POSNER, supra note 2, at 155 (noting that there was no guarantee that Florida
executive officers would have complied with the Florida Supreme Court's orders under such
circumstances); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 768-69 (same).
302 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 768.
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then be counted., 30 3 Congress, then, would have convened on January 6, 2001, to
decide which set of electoral votes to recognize.304
The Electoral Count Act, enacted in 1887 in the wake of the disputed 1876
presidential election, sets down a procedure for Congress to resolve precisely
such a dispute. Section 15 of the Act provides that where a state submits multiple
sets of electoral votes, "those votes, and those only, shall be counted which shall
have been regularly given by the electors who are shown by the determination
mentioned in [3 U.S.C. § 5] to have been appointed."30 5 Section 5 is the now-
famous "safe harbor" provision. It provides that if a state has determined "any
controversy or contest conceming the appointment" of its electors "at least six
days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors," and that determination
was "made pursuant to" state "laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors," then the determination "shall be conclusive, and
shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution,
and as hereinafter regulated. 30 6 But even if one (or both) of the slates had been
appointed by the safe-harbor deadline, 3 U.S.C. § 15 still dictates that Congress
only recognize those electoral votes that "have been regularly given by electors
whose appointment has been lawfully certified., 30 7 And whether the competing
slates had been "regularly given" and "lawfully certified" would have turned on
the constitutionality of the hand count ordered by the Florida Supreme Court and
the appointment of Bush electors by the Florida legislature. When a dispute arises
as to whether competing slates of electors meet these criteria, 3 U.S.C. § 15 states
that Congress shall count those electors "whose title as electors the two Houses,
acting separately, shall concurrently decide is supported by the decision of such
State so authorized by its law., 30 1 If the House and Senate disagree as to which
slate to recognize, "the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been
certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted. ' 309
... U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 ("The President of the
Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted."); POSNER, supra note 2, at 184; Balkin, supra
note 9, at 1432.
304 See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (designating January 6 for Members of Congress to meet in
the House of Representatives to open and tabulate the electoral votes for president and vice
president).
3051d.
3063 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
307 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Moreover, if Congress had attempted to apply the safe harbor
deadline, it would have had to determine whether the respective slates had been
"determin[ed] ... pursuant to" Florida "laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment
of the electors," a question essentially identical to the Article 1 issue. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
30'3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
309Id.
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The Act obviously leaves important gaps. 3'0 For instance, it is unclear how
Congress should determine which slate of electors was "certified by the executive
of the State."311 Presumably, both the Bush and Gore slates could have had such
certification, the former by voluntary act and the latter perhaps under orders from
the Florida Supreme Court. Moreover, it is uncertain what is to happen if a state
executive unlawfully refuses to certify a slate of electors, a clear possibility if the
hand count had gone forward. Nonetheless, the Act establishes some broad
parameters for Congress' deliberations, and it represents a considered decision to
commit the dispute to the political process rather than the judiciary.312 As
Professors Pamela Karlan and Samuel Issacharoff have noted, when Congress
passed the Act, it expressly considered and rejected the alternative of submitting
such controversies to the Supreme Court.313 The Act's sponsor, Senator Sherman
of Ohio, explained during debate on the Senate floor that a plan had been
proposed "to allow questions of this kind to be certified at once to the Supreme
Court for its decisions in case of a division between the two Houses. 314 But the
proposal had "not met with much favor" because "there is a feeling in this country
that we ought not to mingle our great judicial tribunal with political questions." 315
He continued that:
It would be a very grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer a
political question in which the people of the country were aroused, about which
their feelings were excited, to this great tribunal, which after all has to sit upon
the life and property of all the people of the United States.
3 16
Of course, resolution by Congress also offered the significant benefit of investing
a decision of significant political importance in a body that, unlike the Court, is
politically accountable.317
3
"
0 See Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE
AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 9, at 38, 50-51.
' See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 769.
312See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 154 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The legislative
history of the Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve such disputes to
Congress, rather than the courts."); Garrett, supra note 310, at 50-5 1; Samuel Issacharoff, Bush
v Gore: Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 637, 650-53 (2001); Jeffrey Rosen, The
Recount Is in, and the Supreme Court Loses, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17,2001, at A 19.3 13 Issacharoff, supra note 312, at 652; Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore
and the Making of a Precedent, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2001 (Jack Rakove ed.,
2001).
11417 CONG. REc. S817 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1886) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
3151d. at S817-18.
3161d,
3 17As Justice Breyer stated in dissent, "Congress, being a political body, expresses the
people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the people's will is what
elections are about." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
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This is not to say that, all things considered, the nation would have been
better off had Congress resolved Florida's election dispute, an empirical question
that could never be answered definitively. Certainly, the debate would have been
messy and intensely political, and it might have produced a true deadlock. If the
House and Senate split over which slate of electors to recognize, Congress would
have been forced to decide which slate was "certified by the executive of the
State" of Florida, a question that likely would have lacked a clear answer."'
Moreover, had the political process become paralyzed, the Court, having stayed
its hand in November and December, could well have been powerless to
intervene; there is a strong argument that any dispute concerning how Congress is
to count electoral votes would be a nonjusticiable "political question."3 1 9 Perhaps,
as some have contended, leaving the decision to Congress would have
precipitated a genuine constitutional crisis.320
But the relevant point here is that, as the Court was considering whether to
intervene, the most likely scenario if the Court had permitted the hand count to go
forward was for the dispute to be resolved in Congress. In early January,
members of Congress would have been required to render their own judgments as
to which slate of electors had been lawfully appointed, a matter that subsumed the
question whether the manual counting of the undervoted ballots ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause or the "Manner
directed" Clause of Article 1U. Through its decision in Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist
Court did precisely what it has done throughout its major federalism decisions,
from Lopez to Printz to Morrison to Garrett.32" ' Namely, the Court determined
that these important questions of constitutional meaning must be resolved by the
judiciary, not the political process.322 To paraphrase the Chief Justice, the
Balkin, supra note 9, at 1432; Garrett, supra note 310, at 51-54; Issacharoff, supra note 312, at
653 ("But why is it either surprising or alarming that an electoral deadlock should be resolved
by political officials and bodies elected by the same voters?"); Rosen, supra note 312, at A 19
("Congress is better equipped than the courts to make inherently partisan and subjective
decisions about which presidential ballots to count in the event of a dispute."). But see POSNER,
supra note 2, at 145 ("A hurry-up congressional trial of Bush Florida electors versus Gore
Florida electors in January 2001 would have been a travesty of dispute resolution.").
3
"
8 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 769.
319See POSNER, supra note 2, at 141-47.32
° See id. at 161 (stating that it "seems likely" that "without the Court's intervention the
deadlock would have mushroomed into a genuine crisis"); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 769 ("[a]
genuine constitutional crisis might have arisen."). But see Balkin, supra note 9, at 1437-41
(arguing that fears of a constitutional crisis were overblown); Garrett, supra note 310, at 50
("There was no crisis, nor was one likely to arise.").
321 See Karlan, supra note 9, at 97 (noting that, "[g]iven the Court's general attitude"
towards politics, "it is hardly surprising that it declined to leave the question of who Florida's
electors should be to Congress to resolve under the Electoral Count Act").
322 Again, Bush v. Gore did not technically remove these judgments from Congress, but it
did so as a practical matter. See supra note 161.
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lawfulness of the manual count ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was
"ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and [could] be settled
finally only by this Court., 32 3 Once again-and in the most dramatic fashion
possible-the Court found itself responsible for providing the definitive
constitutional answers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore embraced a novel and rather
expansive understanding of equal protection that seems largely out of character
for the Rehnquist Court. But the decision to intervene and resolve the election
dispute was not inconsistent with this Court's general approach to constitutional
federalism. When the breadth of congressional authority has not been at issue, the
Rehnquist Court has not been especially protective of state sovereignty interests.
In fact, in its decisions concerning the principal constitutional limits on state
power-namely, the doctrine of preemption and the dormant Commerce
Clause-the Rehnquist Court has tended to favor the prerogatives of the federal
government and the needs of the national economy over the preservation of
states' political independence. Moreover, the Rehnquist Court's "new federalism"
decisions have been as much about establishing the judiciary's primacy over
Congress in determining the Constitution's meaning as they have been about
reinvigorating the federalism-based limits on Congress' authority. Its decisions
addressing the commerce power, the Tenth Amendment, and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment all have taken constitutional judgments that were
previously left largely to the political process and made them matters for the
Court, finally and exclusively, to resolve.
Bush v. Gore fits these patterns nicely. The election dispute did not involve
the limits on Congress' legislative powers, thus it is unsurprising that the Court
did not fixate on Florida's sovereignty interests. In fact, the Rehnquist Court has
found it necessary to intrude into the sensitive area of how states run their
elections on several occasions. It has overturned Connecticut's closed primary
system, which restricted participation in primary elections to the parties'
registered members,324 as well as California's so-called "blanket" primary, which
permitted voters to cross party lines and vote for members of different parties in
contests for different offices.325 It has prohibited states from limiting the terms of
their congressional representatives' 26 or from indicating on their ballots whether
323 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).324 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
325 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
326U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that Arkansas
constitutional provision that prohibited name of otherwise eligible candidate for Congress from
2001] 1827
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
candidates had supported term limits while in office (or pledged to do so once
elected).327 And it has repeatedly invalidated states' congressional districting
plans, wading into the thicket of assessing state legislators' true motives in
making these intensely political decisions.3 28 The manual count ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court was another incident of state election law that the
Rehnquist Court felt obliged to overturn to protect the national interests at stake,
despite the obvious implications for "the autonomy, the decisionmaking ability,
and the sovereign capacity of the States.
3 29
Bush v. Gore also exemplifies the Rehnquist Court's rather expansive view of
the role of the federal judiciary. Intervening in the election dispute posed great
risks for the Court, especially given the chance that its decision would divide
along predictable ideological lines. Procedures were in place, as set out in the
Electoral Count Act, for Congress to resolve the election dispute, and to many,
Congress' political accountability made it the more appropriate institution for
deciding the most political of controversies. But this Court instead saw it proper
to resolve the matter itself. As in many of its federalism decisions, the Court
determined that the relevant constitutional questions had to be answered outside
the caldron of democratic politics.
In the final paragraph of the per curiam opinion, the Court staked its claim to
the mantle of judicial restraint: "None are more conscious of the vital limits on
judicial authority than are the members of this Court, and none stand more in
admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to
the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere."33 But the
Justices' decisions to grant certiorari and to end the election dispute belie a true
deference to politics. Right or wrong, Bush v. Gore was a very activist decision.33'
Although the Rehnquist Court may be better known for its attention to the
boundary between federal and state power, its "new federalism" has also
substantially altered the allocation of authority between the Court and Congress-
between the judiciary and the political process. This Court has removed several
judgments of constitutional meaning from the realm of politics and made them
appearing on general election ballot if he or she had already served three terms in the House of
Representatives or two terms in the Senate violated the Qualifications Clauses of Article I).
327 Cook v. Gralike, 121 S. Ct. 1029 (2001) (invalidating Missouri law requiring that
statement "DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" appear on
ballot next to name of incumbents who failed to take certain measures in office, and
"DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS" next to challengers who would
not si~n specific pledge).
ZSee Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
329 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
330 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
331 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 258-59; Balkin, supra note 9, at 1433 ("Bush v. Gore is
almost a parody of the Bickelian notion ofjudicial restraint.").
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matters for judicial resolution. Rather than an aberration, Bush v. Gore might
ultimately be the centerpiece of the Rehnquist Court's legacy: a movement
towards a more court-centered view of our constitutional scheme, and an
ingrained distrust of politics as an arbiter of constitutional meaning.

